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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
AND JURISDICTION 
A. List of parties. 
The parties are identified on the caption of the case. 
B. Statement of Jurisdiction. 
This Court has discretionary jurisdiction of this case pursuant to: (1) 
Article VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution; (2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and (5) 
(1996); and (3) Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented by this appeal, together with applicable 
review standards and citation to lower court record, showing the preservations 
below: 
Issue 1. Does the legislative body of the City have the lawful 
authority to pass an ordinance protecting women, children and other members of 
the general public from unwittingly being exposed to sexual or other acts of 
indecency, when these citizens are in places they have a lawful right to be, 
regardless of whether someone else might believe a citizen's presence would be 
"unlikely"? 
A. Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law 
standard, without deference to the lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 
10; 994 P.2d 1243, 1245; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69. 
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B. Issue Preservation. This issue was included in the City's Brief of 
Appellee before the Court of Appeals, at 6-8, and in all arguments 
Issue 2. Did a divided panel of the Court of Appeals err when, without 
a statutory or constitutional requirement to do so, it failed to: (a) apply the "plain 
meaning" rule of statutory construction to a City ordinance; (b) construe the 
ordinance to implement legislative intent; and (c) give the ordinance a 
presumption of validity? 
A. Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law 
standard, without deference to t he lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 
10; 994 P.2d 1243, 1245; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69. 
B. Issue Preservation. The question underlying this issue, meaning of 
"place open to public view" was considered by the trial court (Tr. pp. 27-31). 
Defendant-Roberts was convicted in the trial court, and he appealed to the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was briefed on the issue of the meaning of 
"place open to public view" in the City's ordinance (Brief of Appellant Keith 
Roberts to Court of Appeals, at pp. 6-20; City's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 6-8). The 
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on its own redefinition of "place 
open to public view." 2000 UT 201; 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24. This Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. The City 
presented this issue in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court. 
Issue 3. Did a divided panel of the Court of Appeals err when it 
substituted its view of public policy for that of the duly constituted legislative 
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body of the City and, thereby, authorized the commission of acts of prostitution 
and indecency on streets, sidewalks, parks and private land (open to the public and 
business invitees), so long as the City cannot prove that such activity is "likely" to 
be seen by the general public? 
A. Review Standard. Issue reviewed under a correctness of law 
standard, without deference to the lower court ruling. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 
10; 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 57; Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, 991 P. 2d 67, 69. 
B. Issue Preservation. The question underlying this issue, meaning of 
"place open to public view" was considered by the trial court (Tr. pp. 27-31). 
Defendant-Roberts was convicted in the trial court, and he appealed to the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was briefed on the issue of the meaning of 
"place open to public view" in the City's ordinance (Brief of Appellant Keith 
Roberts to Court of Appeals, at pp. 6-20; City's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 6-8). The 
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on its own redefinition of "place 
open to public view." 2000 UT 201; 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24. This Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. The City 
presented this issue in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES 
The relevant constitutional, statutory, and ordinance provision under 
discussion in this appeal are as follows: 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(M) states in pertinent 
part: 
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M. "Place open for public view" means an area 
capable of use or observance by persons from the 
general community, where an expectation of privacy 
for the activity engaged in by individuals is not 
reasonably justified. 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(P) states in pertinent 
part: 
P. "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any touching of the covered or 
uncovered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas 
or buttocks of the human male or female, whether 
alone or between members of the same or opposite sex 
or between humans and animals in an act of apparent 
sexual stimulation or gratification, which term shall 
include, but not be limited to fellatio, cunnilingus, 
pederasty and bestiality. 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.100 states: 
11.16.100 Urinating in public and other disorderly 
conduct. 
It is unlawful for any person, while in a place open to 
public view, to willfully: 
A. Urinate or stool; 
B. Engage in sexual conduct, alone or with 
another person or an animal; 
C. Make an intentional exposure of his or 
her genitals, pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the 
areola and/or nipple of the female breast; 
D. Exhibit the private parts of any horse, 
bull or other animal in a state of sexual stimulation, or 
to exhibit such animals in the act of sexual copulation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41 states in pertinent part: 
(1) Boards of commissioners and city councils of 
cities may suppress and prohibit the keeping of 
disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, or 
houses kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by, one or more persons for acts of perversion, 
lewdness, or prostitution within the limits of the city 
and within three miles of the outer boundaries thereof, 
and may prohibit resorting thereto for any of the 
purposes aforesaid; they may also make it unlawful for 
any person to commit or offer or agree to commit an 
act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral 
perversion within the city, or for any person to secure, 
induce, procure, offer, or transport to any place within 
the city any person for the purpose of committing an 
act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral 
perversion, or for any person to receive or direct or 
offer or agree to receive or direct any person into any 
place or building within the city for the purpose of 
committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire, 
lewdness, or moral perversion, or for any person to 
aid, abet, or participate in the commission of any of the 
foregoing.... 
(2) (a) A woman's breast feeding, including 
breast feeding in any place where the woman 
otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any 
circumstance constitute an obscene or lewd act, 
irrespective of whether or not the breast is covered 
during or incidental to feeding. 
(b) Boards of commissioners and city 
councils of cities may not prohibit a woman's breast 
feeding in any location where she otherwise may 
rightfully be, irrespective of whether the breast is 
uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-50 states: 
(1) Boards of commissioners and city councils of 
cities may provide for the punishment of any person or 
persons for: 
(a) disturbing the peace or good order of the 
city; 
(b) disturbing the peace of any person or 
persons; 
(c) disturbing any lawful assembly; 
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(d) public intoxication; 
(e) challenging, encouraging, or engaging in 
fighting; 
(f) using obscene or profane language in a 
place or under circumstances which could cause a 
breach of the peace or good order of the city; 
(g) engaging in indecent or disorderly 
conduct; 
(h) engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior 
or conduct in the city; and 
(i) interfering with any city officer in the 
discharge of his duty. 
(2) Boards of commissioners and city councils of 
cities may provide for the punishment of trespass and 
such other petty offenses as the board of 
commissioners or city council may consider proper. 
(3) (a) A woman's breast feeding, including 
breast feeding in any location where she otherwise 
may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance 
constitute a lewd or indecent act, irrespective of 
whether or not the breast is covered during or 
incidental to feeding. 
(b) Boards of commissioners and city 
councils of cities may not prohibit a woman's breast 
feeding in any location where she otherwise may 
rightfully be, irrespective of whether the breast is 
uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 states: 
10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations - Passage -
Penalties. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary 
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the 
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the 
morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
£ 
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convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city; and may enforce 
obedience to the ordinances with fines or penalties as 
they may deem proper, but the punishment of any 
offense shall be by fine not to exceed the maximum 
class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or 
by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both 
the fine and imprisonment. 
U.S. Const. Amendment IV states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Roberts was charged with having committed Disorderly 
Conduct, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code Section 
11.16.100. On August 30, 1999, following a bench trial, the trial judge found 
Defendant-Roberts guilty as charged. On appeal, on June 29, 2000, the Utah 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the 
law set forth in its opinion to the evidence, to determine whether Defendant-
Roberts's conduct was "open to public view." On August 7, 2000, before the trial 
court could consider the case on remand, Appellant Salt Lake City (the "City") 
petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted on October 
20, 2000. 
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B. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On the evening of July 9, 1999, Officers Anthony Russell and 
Shawn Player of the Vice Squad of the Salt Lake City Police Department were 
working on south State Street when they observed a known prostitute approach 
several cars, the last of which she entered. The car then drove away. Police 
officers followed the vehicle, which was driven by Defendant-Roberts. 
Transcript, pp. 6-8, 15, 26. 
2. The officers followed Defendant-Roberts's car to the area of 1300 
South and 500 West underneath the viaduct, which is a popular place of 
assignations and for the police to apprehend prostitutes. Defendant-Roberts was 
apparently spooked by a marked police car that drove by. Thereafter, the car left 
the viaduct area and drove to 900 West and 1860 South, where Defendant-Roberts 
parked it in a bar's back parking lot. Tr., p. 9. 
3. After parking their vehicles in front of the bar, the officers walked 
around the bar and observed the back parking lot of the bar. Tr., p. 10. 
4. The officers described the area as "open to public view," and 
observed that the parking lot went all around the bar, until it met an adjacent 
business in the back. Tr., p. 10. 
5. The parking lot was open for public parking; thus, anybody could 
walk into that area. The officers observed people coming out of the bar and going 
8 
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to their cars in the parking lot. Tr., pp. 123 25-26.l 
6. The officers observed that Defendant-Roberts had parked in the 
parking lot, between a parked flatbed truck and the wall of the adjacent business 
building. The car was next to a chain link fence to the west and south. Tr., pp. 12, 
20, 24. 
7. Officer Russell went under the flatbed truck and approached to 
within 15 to 20 feet of the car. He did not have to go under the truck to get to the 
area where Defendant-Roberts was located, but did so to remain undetected by 
Defendant-Roberts. Tr., pp. 12, 14, 17-18,21. From that vantage point, Officer 
Russell could see into the back window of the car. He saw the prostitute lift her 
shirt, exposing her breasts, and saw Defendant-Roberts put his mouth to the 
woman's breasts. Tr., p. 15; Video Transcript, 5:03:02 - 5:04:21. 
8. Officer Russell then approached the passenger side of the car, 
knocked on the window and showed his badge and identified himself. From that 
position, Officer Russell could see that the woman's shirt was still up and 
Defendant-Roberts's pants were down. His penis was exposed. Tr., p. 16. 
1
 At trial, Officer Russell drew a diagram to explain his testimony. The diagram is 
found in the videotape transcript of the trial. The video transcript is in the Court 
record. Two still photographs of the video transcript showing the diagram are 
attached as Exhibit "B" showing time sequences 5:02:33 and 5:02:37. The top of 
the diagram is west. From the top of the diagram down, Officer Russell indicated 
a two story cinderblock building behind the bar, Defendant-Roberts's vehicle, a 
flat bed trailer (below and to the right of Defendant-Roberts's car), additional 
parking, and the bar. Officer Russell drew a line indicating his path to the flat bed 
trailer. Tr., pp. 13, 14; Video Transcript 5:02:29 - 5:03:01; see also still photos of 
5:02:33 and 5:02:37, Exhibit "B;" Tr., p. 19. There is also a road to the north with 
an entrance to the parking lot. Tr., pp. 19, 20; Video Transcript 5:07:52 - 5:08:18. 
o 
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9. The area from which Officer Russell was looking into Defendant-
Roberts 5s car was an area that anybody from the public could walk to and enter. 
While Defendant-Roberts and the prostitute were in the parking lot, several other 
cars were parked there, and numerous people came out of the bar and walked 
through the parking lot to get to those cars. Tr., pp. 16-17, 20-22, 25-26; Video 
Transcript, 5:09:41 - 5:10:05; Video Transcript 5:05:12 - 5:05:50, 5:08:48 -
5:08:53. 
10. There were at least three ways for the public to walk back to where 
Defendant-Roberts had parked his car. A person could walk in from the road, 
from the parking lot or from the southeast of Defendant-Roberts's vehicle. Tr., p. 
21; Video Transcript, 5:09:41 - 5:10:05. 
11. Officer Player arrested Defendant-Roberts for disorderly conduct, 
pursuant to Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.100. After a bench trial, Defendant-
Roberts was found guilty by Third District Court Judge David Young. Tr., p. 31. 
12. The trial court concluded that the events took place in a public 
parking lot. The trial court also ruled that a public parking lot is a place open to 
public view because the public could move around in and'out of the building and 
into the parking lot where the illegal acts took place. Tr., p. 30. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. City acted within its enabling power; however, Court of Appeals 
improperly judicially amended a clear City ordinance by adding a new 
condition that the offensive conduct must be in a place "likely" to be 
10 
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observed. 
The legislative body of Salt Lake City enacted an ordinance in which it 
sought to protect the general public from unwittingly being exposed to acts of 
lewdness or indecency in any place in which the general public has a lawful right 
to be. The City Council used the unambiguous phrase "place open to public view" 
to communicate this legislative intent, and defined the phrase in the ordinance. 
The Court of Appeals ignored the plain meaning rule for determining 
legislative intent and5 instead, judicially legislated its own public policy judgment 
by, in effect, amending the City's ordinance to require that the indecent acts be 
performed in a place where it is "likely" they will be observed. 
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the City has the enabling 
power to enact such police power laws. It also failed to follow this Court's 
instructions that such City powers are to be read broadly and are presumptively 
valid. In addition, the Court of Appeals failed to apply Utah precedent, from the 
Fourth Amendment context, regarding the meaning of "open to public view." 
The result of the Court of Appeals's decision is that, if this ruling is upheld, 
the City will be powerless to protect the public from being unwittingly exposed to 
sexual and other indecent conduct in places in which they lawfully have a right to 
be, if someone might subjectively believe it was not likely that people would be 
passing by. That result contradicts the clear legislative intent of the City Council, 
acting within its lawful powers granted by the State Legislature and constitutional 
law. It is also bad public policy. 
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B. Guidance of Fourth Amendment cases; misconstruction of facts. 
In its Fourth Amendment cases, this Court has defined "place open to 
public view" in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Two members of the 
Court of Appeals panel erroneously held that those cases do not support the City's 
interpretation of its disorderly conduct ordinance. The Court of Appeals also 
misconstrued certain uncontested facts in this case by not viewing them in a light 




THE CITY'S LEGISLATIVE BODY LAWFULLY 
ACTED WITHIN ITS ENABLING POWER WHEN 
IT ENACTED AN ORDINANCE TO PROTECT 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC FROM UNWITTINGLY 
BEING EXPOSED TO SEXUAL ACTIVITY. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN JUDICIALLY 
AMENDING THAT ORDINANCE BY ADDING A 
NEW CONDITION AND SUBSTITUTING ITS 
JUDGMENT REGARDING PUBLIC POLICY. 
A. City enabling power and presumption of validity. 
The duly constituted legislative body of the City enacted an ordinance 
designed to control acts of prostitution and protect the general public from 
unwittingly being exposed to sex and other acts of indecency. In relevant part the 
ordinance provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, while in a place open to 
public view, to willfully: 
1 O 
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(A) . . . 
(B) Engaged in sexual conduct, alone or with 
another person or animal] 
(C) Make an intentional exposure of his or her 
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the 
areola and/or nipple of the female breast, 
(D) . . . 
§ 11.16.100 Salt Lake City Code (emphasis added). The ordinance also defines 
the term "sexual conduct" to include sexual intercourse, the touching of the 
uncovered genitals or the female human breast or pubic areas, when done in the 
context of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. § 11.16.010 Salt Lake City 
Code. 
Facially, this police power enactment was drafted to protect the unwitting 
public from being exposed to the specified offensive acts, when these citizens are 
in areas where they had a lawful right to be. It also provides law enforcement with 
a tool in the fight against prostitution. 
State enabling law grants to cities the power to enact such laws that are 
"necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, promote 
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of the property in 
the ci ty. . . ." § 10-8-84 Utah Code Ann., 1953. More specifically, State law 
provides that cities may prohibit prostitution and "lewdness, or moral perversion 
within the city," § 10-8-41(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, and may provide for the 
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punishment of persons for "engaging in indecent or disorderly conduct" or 
"engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior or conduct in the city/' § 10-8-50, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953. 
In construing this State enabling power section, this Court clearly rejected 
the old Dillon Rule and ruled that local governmental police powers should be 
broadly construed. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Dairy 
Product Services, Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 
26. This Court has also ruled that these powers specifically include the right to 
prohibit prostitution and allied activities. Salt Lake City v. Alfred, 437 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1968); Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake City, 624 P.2d 1149 (Utah 
1981). 
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld that principle, even in the 
context of a free speech challenge. It said "there is nothing objectionable about a 
city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity. . . . " City of Erie v. Pap's 
AM, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1394 (2000). 
In sum, this Court has consistently ruled that the general police powers of 
cities are to be read broadly. Ordinances enacted thereunder are presumptively 
valid. The challenger to a city ordinance has the burden of proof to establish, by a 
heightened level of judicial scrutiny, that a challenged law is incompatible with a 
particular legal or constitutional provision. That is, the presumptions of validity 
and constitutionality attach to municipal ordinances as strongly as they do to State 
legislative enactments. Thus, the courts will interfere with a City's legislative 
14 
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decisions only when they are "capricious and arbitrary," lacking any rational basis 
for support, or are "wholly discordant to reason and justice." State v. Packer, 297 
P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1931); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952); Salt 
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 915, 
47 L.Ed. 2d 766 (1975); City ofMonticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 
1990); 5 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 19.06 (3rd Rev. Ed.); Triangle Oil v. 
North Salt Lake City Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980). 
These concepts were well summarized by Professor McQuillin in his 
respected treatise on municipal corporations wherein it is observed: 
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional 
unless clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will be 
made to sustain it. Not only must unconstitutionality 
appear clear, but, it has been asserted, it must appear 
and be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . If the 
constitutional questions raised are fairly debatable, the 
court must declare the ordinance constitutional, as the 
court cannot and must not substitute its judgment for 
that of the local legislative body, 
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd Rev. Ed. Rev) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, this Court observed: 
It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that the 
courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless 
it clearly and manifestly violates some provision of the 
constitution of the United States. Every presumption 
must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an 
act, and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its 
validity, (citations omitted) The whole burden lies on 
him who denies the constitutionality of a legislative 
enactment. 
1 * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Packer, 297 P.2d at 1016. 
Respondent-Roberts did not meet these tests and the ordinance is valid and 
enforceable, as written. 
B. Courts are required to construe an ordinance to implement 
legislative intent using the law's plain meaning. 
After determining that a city's legislative enactment is within the city's 
enabling power and does not offend the Constitution, it is a court's duty to 
construe the ordinance in accordance with the legislature's intent, as determined 
by the law's plain language. This Court has clearly stated: "Generally, the best 
indication of [legislative] intent is a statute's plain language'' Perrine v. 
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, two members of the Court of Appeals erred by not 
applying the plain meaning rule, and thereby determining legislative intent, to the 
phrase "place open to public view" in § 11.16.100 Salt Lake City Code. 
C. By judicial fiat a split panel of the Court of Appeals wrongfully 
judicially amended a City ordinance and substituted its public policy 
preference for that of the elected City legislature. 
Defendant-Roberts claims that this matter should not be an issue before this 
Court because, he asserts, the Court of Appeals upheld the City's right to enact an 
indecent exposure ordinance. That claim is incorrect. The holding of the Court of 
Appeals diminishes the City Council's ability to pass an ordinance that will be 
interpreted according to its plain meaning. Further, it creates law that prevents the 
16 
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City's elected officials from making it illegal to engage in sex acts that can be 
viewed by the non-consenting public in "places open to public view." 
In enacting the Disorderly Conduct ordinance, the City used the words 
"place open to public view." The phrase "place open for public view" was 
defined by the City Council in Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010(M) (1986). It 
provides: "'[p]lace open for public view5 means an area capable of use or 
observance by persons from the general community, where an expectation of 
privacy for the activity engaged in by individuals is not reasonably justified." 
That definition supports the City's position argued before the Court of 
Appeals and taken before this Court in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Under 
the definition, conduct occurs in a "place open for public view" if: (1) the place is 
capable of either (a) use, or (b) observance, by persons from the general 
community; and (2) the place is such that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
could not be reasonable justified. Defendant-Roberts's situation clearly meets that 
definition. The facts in the case at bar are not in dispute and demonstrate that the 
public parking lot involved was capable of use by the public and was capable of 
being observed by the public. 
However, the divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that, in addition, 
the conduct in such a place had to be "likely to be observed by a member of the 
public." No such language appears in the ordinance definition, which instead 
All of the parties, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals previously overlooked 
the definition of "place open for public view" in Salt Lake City Code 
§ 11.16.010(M). 
17 
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refers to a "reasonable expectation of privacy." This legislative definition is 
consistent with Utah case law on this point. A person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an automobile parked in a parking lot open to the public. 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). In that search and seizure case, this Court 
held: "[f]or an officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully 
accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy." Id. at 51. (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, the ordinance definition is consistent with the better reasoned 
case law from other jurisdictions. Those cases affirm that the legislature may 
lawfully prohibit sexual conduct where it was "possible" to be observed by the 
general public. They establish that such offensive behavior can occur in a "place 
open to public view," even though actual observation of the conduct might be 
"unlikely." For example, in Louisiana, a man was convicted of indecent exposure 
for standing naked in front of a window of his own home, where he was visible 
from the sidewalk outside, because it violated an ordinance that prohibited such 
conduct where it was "open to public view." State v. Odom, 554 So.2d 1281 (La. 
App. 1989). 
Similarly, the State of New Mexico interpreted the words "public view" in 
an indecency statute to mean a place that was "accessible or visible to the general 
public." State v. Artrip, 811 P.2d 585 (N.M. App. 1991). The Michigan Court of 
Appeals interpreted a statute that prohibited this type of sexual conduct in a 
"public place." It held this term to mean that the legal review standard is "whether 
18 
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there is a possibility that the unsuspecting public could be exposed to or view the 
[sex] act." People v. Brown, 564 N.W.2d 919 (Mich. App. 1997) (emphasis 
added); see also People v. Lino, 527 N.W.2d 434 (Mich. 1994). These well 
reasoned decisions properly implemented the legislative intent and public policy 
of protecting the unsuspecting and unwitting public, as opposed to rewriting the 
statute or ordinance to protect perpetrators of offensive conduct. 
The split panel of the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the words 
"place open to public view" in the disorderly conduct ordinance. It read this 
phrase as if it was identical to "public place," and then added an additional 
condition by judicial fiat and said that "open to public view" means that the City 
must also prove that the conduct is "likely to be seen." In effect, the Court of 
Appeals re-wrote the ordinance and adopted its own public policy preference. 
This additional judicial requirement is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
ordinance. In creating it, two members of the Court of Appeals subordinated the 
City's legislative decision that the general public has a right to be free from 
unwelcome exposure to sexual acts, when they are traveling in or about places 
they have a lawful right to be. In this paradigm shift, the Court of Appeals created 
new rights for prostitutes and other persons to willfully engage in sex acts or 
indecent conduct in places "open to public view," so long as they or some third-
person might subjectively determine that the conduct was "unlikely" to be seen by 
members of the general public. Thus, the Court of Appeals panel substituted its 
policy judgment for that of the City's legislative body and sacrificed the general 
10 
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public's right to be free of exposure to this offensive behavior. 
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals cited no Utah precedent and no 
Constitutional principle. Rather, it cited inapplicable cases from other 
jurisdictions which interpreted ordinance or statutory language dissimilar to Salt 
Lake City's and which was more liberal to those engaging in sex acts and less 
protective of the general public, because those laws prohibited this type of sexual 
conduct only in "public places."3 None of the cases relied on by the Court of 
Appeals majority opinion construed language similar to that used in the City's 
ordinance, where the legislative decision was to protect the public and prohibit 
offensive sexual conduct in a much broader venue: "places open to public view." 
In the instant case, all of the foregoing principles of statutory construction 
and respecting the role of the legislative branch of government were disregarded 
by a majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals, over the vigorous and correct 
dissent of Judge Bench. Thus, without reference to any constitutional violation, 
the Court of Appeals judicially amended a lawful City ordinance, thereby 
substituting its policy judgment for that of the duly elected legislative body of the 
City. Id. This decision is clearly in error and must be reversed to enable the City 
Council to perform its lawful duties under Utah constitutional and statutory law. 
3
 See discussion at 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. Notably, in two of the three cases 
relied on by the two member majority of the Court of Appeals, the statutes 
involved actually defined "public place" to mean a place where the conduct was 
likely to be viewed by others. In contrast, Salt Lake City's ordinance does not use 
that definition; instead, it uses one indicating a much broader meaning. The other 
cases are, therefore, inapposite and distinguishable. 
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In sum, in this case Defendant-Roberts engaged in sexual conduct in a 
public parking lot, which was capable of both use and observance by the general 
public. Under State v.Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), Defendant-Roberts could not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile at such a location. 
Therefore, Defendant-Roberts's conduct fell within the plain meaning of the 
ordinance's definition of disorderly conduct, and the trial judge's conviction was 
proper under law and should be affirmed. The Court of Appeals erred by 
appending a "likely to be seen" component onto the elements of the crime; this 
judicial appendage to the City ordinance must be corrected for future prosecutions 
and the protection of the public's welfare. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY DEFINED AN AREA WHICH IS 
"OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW" AS ONE WHICH IS VIEWED 
"FROM A POSITION LAWFULLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC." 
The plain meaning of the definition of "place open for public view" in the 
City's ordinance is consistent with this Court's holding in Fourth Amendment 
cases, in which this Court has defined the term "open to public view." In these 
cases, this Court has held that an area is "open to public view" when it "is in open 
view from a position lawfully accessible to the public...." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
at 51; see also, State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1984); State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 592 
(Utah 1983). 
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In Lee, this Court stated, "[i]t has long been the law that objects falling 
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is entitled to be are 
not the subject of an unlawful search." This Court went on to state, ff[f]or an 
officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully accessible to the 
public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectancy of privacy." 633 
P.2d at 51 (emphasis added). 
While the Lee opinion was written in a search and seizure case, its analysis 
is similar to the case at bar because it discusses a person's lawful expectation of 
privacy in the context of what is open to public view. This case clearly holds that 
a person has no expectation of privacy if he commits acts in a place where the 
public is lawfully allowed. Notwithstanding this helpful and revelant holding, the 
majority of the Court of Appeals panel disregarded this case and, instead, chose to 
cite non-precedential and inapposite opinions from the states of New York, Hawaii 
and Florida. 
The irony of the Court of Appeals's two-member majority view is its 
illogical inconsistency of policy. The United States and Utah Constitutions 
provide a high level of protection to citizens from unreasonable searches by the 
government; yet, those constitutions allow police seizures of property in places 
"open to public view." In stark contrast, the Court of Appeals strangely concludes 
that offensive sex acts are not subject to police action unless they meet a much 
higher standard of being "likely" to be seen. Irrationally, the Court of Appeals 
grants greater rights to persons engaging in illegal sex acts in places open to public 
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view than it does to persons under police surveillance for other crimes. That is 
nonsensical. More importantly, it may unwittingly create precedent for reopening 
the current law on search and seizure standards. 
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals unnecessarily creates a 
conflict between the meaning of "open to public view" in the search and seizure 
cases and the public indecency context. The City should be able to rely on 
definitions set forth by this Court when creating its ordinances, especially in this 
case where the City seeks to protect the general public from unwelcome exposure 
to lewd or indecent behavior. The Court of Appeals's decision is in serious error 
and contrary to controlling precedent of this Court; therefore, it should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DO NOT PROVIDE 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority panel of the Court of Appeals recast 
the facts in a light most favorable to its policy declaration. It did not construe the 
facts in a light most favorable to supporting the verdict of a trial judge, who was 
able to better evaluate the credibility and totality of the evidence. Although it is 
not relevant to the serious legal errors made by the Court of Appeals, to place the 
matter in factual context, this Court should be aware of the following uncontested 
facts: 
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(1) The property where the offense occurred was private property. It 
was a parking lot of a commercial establishment that was open for business. Thus, 
the parking lot was an area to which the general public was lawfully entitled to be, 
particularly for patrons of the businesses. (Facts Nos. 4, 5.) 
(2) The diagram attached as Exhibit "B" to this Brief was the one before 
the trial judge. (See Fact No. 5.) It clearly demonstrates that the location of the 
offensive conduct, subject of the criminal charge, was near a chain link fence and 
the parked car in which the sex acts occurred. Thus, the illegal behavior could be 
observed from the other side of the fence. Further, it occurred at a location to 
which the general public had lawful access. The universe of citizens who could 
have observed the sex acts included the owner of the trailer parked on the side of 
Defendant-Roberts's car, any citizen taking a stroll, or anyone parking a car in the 
vicinity. (See Facts Nos. 5, 9-10.) 
(3) One member of the police department was able to walk up to the 
side of the vehicle in which the sex acts were being performed. Although much 
was made in the Court of Appeals majority opinion that a police officer crawled 
under a truck bed, that maneuver was not undertaken because of the difficulty of 
access. Rather, it was undertaken to clandestinely approach the vehicle and 
observe what was reasonably expected to be a sexual liaison between a known 
prostitute and her "John." Contrary to the "spin" placed on it by the majority 
opinion of the Court of Appeals, that maneuver did not suggest that the car was 
parked other than in a place "open to public view." It was simply a lawful act 
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performed by a law enforcement officer in order to observe conduct that could 
have been seen by a member of the general public. (Facts Nos. 5, 7, 9-10.) 
The Court of Appeals should have reviewed the trial court's findings of fact 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). However, it failed to do so, and, by 
re-casting the facts, the Court of Appeals overstepped its authority in reviewing a 
trial court's judgment. 
In this case there was more than adequate evidence before the trial court to 
sustain the guilty verdict, under the "open to public view" standard. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the guilty verdict of 
the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals poses a serious and 
significant public policy concern. In essence, it requires the City to now prove a 
subjective element of whether a given location would be one "likely" to be seen by 
a member of the public. This new element gives prostitutes and others engaged in 
indecent behavior a license to use many places open to public access for illegal 
activity just because they are not in heavily traveled areas. 
As a consequence, the public can expect to be affronted by offensive sexual 
conduct when they are lawfully traveling in an area that is less used or at a late 
hour. Therefore, the City will be powerless to protect those who take a stroll late 
in the evening, at a location where some third-party subjectively believes it is not 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"likely" that people would be passing by. Also, viaducts, cul-de-sacs, parking lots 
or other public ways will become late night "cribs" for prostitution. 
The Court of Appeals usurpation of the legislative function must not be 
allowed to stand. It interferes with the thoughtful legislative decisions of State and 
local government. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the panel 
of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /5^day of December, 2000. 
City Attorney 
BOYD A. FERGUSON 
Assistant City Attorney 
RICHARD W. DAYNES 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
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EXHIBIT A 
Opinion of Court of Appeals 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kode-co Salt Lake Ci 
pProvo Utah 398 Utah A 
opinion m this case, Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35, 
36-37 (Utah Ct App 1994) - - *- ~ — ~*. 
2. Treatment of this issue on remand would seem-to--be 
beyond the scope of our remand order. See Nelson, 872 ; 
P.2dat37,38 However, ma way our prior opinion left this ! 
issue open for further discussion. We did conclude that j 
Provo never held the land in fee simple, but held only legal 
title m trust for Provo's collective occupants as 
beneficiaries, see id. at 37, and we deemed it unnecessary 
to decide whether Provo's interest in Old 900 South was a 
determinable fee, see id. n.3 (H[W]e determine thatwhether ; 
City's interest was that of a determinable fee or a fee simple, j 
the interest was held only m trust"). Still, past focus by the 
parties and courts on the important question of Erovo's ! 
trusteeship leaves unturned a key to resolving~this. case: \ 
Whether the nature of Provo's interest in the road-before ! 
vacation was a determinable fee, leaving a reversionary 
interest in Landowners? 
3. Based on our disposition, we need not address otHer j 
issues raised by Landowners-i.e., the trial court's failure to 
apply the law of the case or whether fee simple absolute 
title m Provo would be void under the Townsite Act,Also, 
we have reviewed and decline Provo's jequest at oral 
argument for reconsideration of our denial of its previous
 ( 
motion for summary disposition. Finally, JEtoyq'lUted Jhe \ 
following issue in its brief, which was not raised by 
Landowners nor followed up on by Provo: "Was the district 
court's decision denying appellants' claim for damages due 
to a taking by the city supported by the legal principles 
governing the case?" We thus do not consider it 
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Third District, Salt Lake Department 
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W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, for Appellant 
Richard W. Daynes, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
f 1 Defendant appeals his conviction for disorderly 
conduct under Salt Lake City Code section 11.16.100. 
We affirm in part and remand with instructions. 
FACTS 
t2 Two undercover Salt Lake City police officers 
fnllnwerl defendant's car to a Darkine lot behind a bar I 
23 
and leaving the parking lot, and that anyone could 
walk back to the area m the lot where the couple was 
parked, which was behind two flatbed trucks. He 
stated that the car was in an area that was "open to 
public view." However, to observe defendant and his 
companion without being spotted by them, the 
officers "parked in front of the bar so [defendant and 
his companion] couldn't see [the police] car and . . . 
snuck around on foot and approached the car." One 
officer then crawled underneath one of the flatbed 
trucks to approach the car so he could not be seen. 
The officer testified that after emerging from under 
the flatbed truck he was standing "15 to 20 feet 
away." The officer stated, "I could see into the back 
window. She was sitting in the passenger seat turned 
toward him. I saw her lift her shirt, exposing her 
breasts. I saw the driver put his mouth to her breasts 
. . . and that's when I approached the car from the 
back." The officer further testified that the trucks 
"gave them a little bit of hiding room," that defendant 
and his companion were "somewhat hidden" behind 
the trucks, and that no member of the public would be 
likely to crawl underneath the truck to observe 
defendant's conduct However, the officer repeatedly 
stated that a person could get to the area where^ 
defendant had parked without crawling under the 
truck. 
f 3 Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted 
of disorderly conduct under section 11.16.100 of the 
Salt Lake City Code. 
ANALYSIS 
I. City Ordinance 
T[4 Defendant first asserts the city ordinance under 
which he was convicted is invalid because it does not 
mirror the state statute governing lewdness. See Utat! 
Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1996). This is a question of 
law; thus, we review it for correctness. See State vj 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that ordinances passed 
by municipalities are valid unless they are 
inconsistent or conflict with state law. See Redwood 
Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138; 
1144 (Utah 1981); Salt Lake City v. Alfred, 20 Utaff 
2d 298,299,437 P.2d 434,435 (1968); see also Utah1 
Code Ann. § 10- 8-84 (1999). Municipal ordinances 
and state law are not inconsistent when they share a 
common purpose and are "closely related in subject 
matter." Allred, 437 P.2d at 437. Furthermore, a 
"municipal ordinance need not be identical to the 
controlling state statute to be consistent with it." 
Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). In this case, the fact that the language of 
the Salt Lake City ordinance does not mirror the state 
statute does not render the ordinance invalid. The 
common purpose of both the city ordinance and state 
law is to prohibit sexual behavior m places where the 
public may be affronted or offended. Compliance 
with the city ordinance does not preclude compliance 
with state law or vice versa. See Walker v Union Pacv 
R.R. Co , 844 P 2d 335, 339-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1992% 
(holding city ordinance preempted by state l a \^ 
because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed;' 
under state law). Accordingly, we affirm the tna£ 
court's conclusion that Salt Lake City Codef 
Ml. 16.100 is valid as it does not conflict with state* 
_w v. Roberts 
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support a finding that he "[e]ngage[d] m sexual 
conduct . . . with another person," as prohibited by 
section 11.16.100(B) or "ma[d]e an intentional 
exposure of his . . . genitals, pubic area, buttocks or 
any portion of the areola and/or nipple of the female 
breast," as prohibited by section 11.16.100(C).2 We 
review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 
647, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
f6 We conclude the facts before the trial court were 
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant "engaged in sexual conduct" within the 
meaning of the ordinance. The Salt Lake City Code 
defines "sexual conduct" as "human masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any touching of the covered or 
uncovered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas 
or buttocks of the human male or female, whether 
alone or between members of the same or opposite 
sex." Salt Lake City Code § 11.16.010. Undisputed 
trial testimony established that one of the arresting1 
officers saw defendant parked in his car kissing the 
exposed breasts of the woman he was with and saw 
defendant's exposed genitals. This testimony 
sufficiently supported a finding of "sexual conduct." 
III. Place "Open to Public View" 
f7 Finally, defendant argues that he was improperly 
convicted because he was not "in a place open to 
public view" when the sexual conduct occurred. See 
id. § 11.16.100. The trial court found defendant was 
"in a place open to public view" under the ordinance 
because defendant "was [in] a public parking lot" 
when the conduct took place. Defendant claims the 
district court's interpretation of the statutory language 
was in'error. "Because a district court's interpretation 
of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for 
correctness." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 
(Utah 1998). 
1(8 The relevant portion of the ordinance states: "It 
shall be unlawful for any person, while in a place 
open to public view, to willfully: . . . B. Engage in 
sexual conduct, alone or with another person." Salt 
Lake City Code § 11.16.100. No Utah case has 
defined what constitutes "open to public view" under 
the ordinance. However, in addressing similar 
situations, other jurisdictions have emphasized the 
fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. For example, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that consensual 
sexual activity in a city park 
near the lagoon, at seven o'clock in the 
morning on the first of September, on a 
bright, sunshiny day, where people walked 
their dogs and jogged (as the defendant 
himself was doing), and where the defendant 
not only could have been but in fact was seen 
by a police officer riding in an automobile on 
an access road, was indeed [in] a "public 
place" in that there was a high probability 
that the deviate conduct would be viewed by 
other members of the public. 
State v. Bans, 305 N.E.2d 592, 593 (111. App. Ct. 
1973). In contrast, in a case involving sexual conduct 
occurring in a parked vehicle "in a turnaround area 
opposite a residence" at 3:30 a.m., where "the car was 
stationed between two street lights," where "no 
persons other than the police officers saw [defendant,] 
and they themselves would not have seen him had 
they not followed him from Maunakea Street" anH 
Provo, Ut&H 
traffic on the lane was offered," the court held "it was 
improbable that [defendant's] acts would be observed 
by members of the public" and reversed defendant^ 
conviction. State v. Broad, 600 P.2d 1379, 1379-82 
(Haw. 1979). 
f 9 As the Court of Appeals of New York pointed 
out, "it is necessary to interpret and apply the statute 
here in a manner that comports with its purpose.? 
People v. McNamara, 585 N.E.2d 788, 793 (N.Y. 
1991) (interpreting term "public place"). "That g 
member of the public may pass by is certainly part of 
the essence of a public place, and the harm to suchra 
person's sensibilities is precisely that aimed at by the 
statute. Conversely, where no such harm is likely, the 
statute is not violated." Id. Thus, we agree with the 
New York court that "[s]exual acts performed in 
parked cars . . . may be prosecuted [under thg 
ordinance] when . . . the objective circumstances 
establish that the lewd acts committed there can and 
likely would be seen by a casual passerby." Id. 
f 10 Defendant contends the fact that he parked his 
car at night behind flatbed trucks in the rear area of 
the parking lot, which was bordered by a two-storj 
cement wall, a chain-link fence, and a closet} 
business, does not support the trial court's conclusion 
that he was "in a place open to public view." 1? 
111 In this case, the trial court concluded that thf 
parking lot behind the bar was "open to public view'1 
under the ordinance. The court apparently relied upoS 
the fact that the conduct took place in a public* 
parking lot, stating at trial, "I think the problem is that 
the language [of the ordinance] is tough to deal with, 
but I'm not going to struggle with it too much. It was, 
a public parking lot, in my view, it was [therefore] 
open to public view." We conclude the trial judge 
applied an incorrect legal standard equating a publig 
parking lot to the statutorily required "place open to 
public view." A public parking lot, such as the on^ 
behind the bar where defendant's conduct occurredf 
may or may not be a "place open to public view" for 
purposes of the ordinance. This determination turns 
on the facts of each case. The key inquiry is whether 
the conduct is likely to be observed by a member oji 
the public. See Broad, 600 P.2d at 1381 (quoting 
State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684, 688 (Haw. 1970) 
(stating that "the trier of fact is justified in finding th^ 
place public if the exposure is such that it is likely t& 
be seen by a number of casual observers")).3 
112 TTie record indicates that the officers had 
followed defendant's car to the bar; they had not 
merely passed by and spotted the activity. One officer 
saw defendant kissing the exposed breast of his 
companion, but only after the officer crawled under 
the flatbed truck, which the officer admitted would be* 
an unusual thing for a casual passerby or bar patron to" 
do. However, the officers testified that numerous 
patrons were arriving and leaving the parking lot and 
that any of them could have walked to the area where 
defendant had parked his car. One officer further, 
testified that he could see the conduct at issue when* 
standing fifteen to twenty feet away from the car. 
From the record before us, we cannot determine as a 
matter of law whether defendant was or was not "in a 
place open to public view." Accordingly, we remand* 
this case to the trial court with instructions to apply, 
the law as set forth m this opinion to the evidence, 
av Kep. 23 
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State v. Giro*, 943 P.2d 1114,1121 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)' (remanding for trial court to re-examine 
previously presented evidence Jl[b]ecause the trial 
court was operating under a misunderstanding of the 
law"); State v Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (remanding because trial court's findings 
were inadequate for appellate court to determine 
whether legal standard was properly applied), 
CONCLUSION 
If 13 We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Salt 
Lake City Code § 11.16.100 is valid. We conclude 
the facts before the trial court were sufficient to show 
beyond areasonable doubt that defendant "engaged in 
sexual conduct" within the meaning of the ordinance. 
Because we cannot determine as a matter of law from 
the record whether defendant's conduct occurred in a 
place "open to public view," we remand with 
instructions that the trial court apply the legal 
standard set forth in this opinion. The trial court 
should then reaffirm or vacate defendant's conviction 
depending on its determination whether or not the 
conduct occurred "in a place open to public view." 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
f 14 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting in part): 
|15 I agree with sections I and EL of the main 
opinion. I disagree, however, with section HI because 
I do not believe the trial court needs to redetermine 
whether this sexual conduct occurred "in a place open 
to public view." 
Tfl 6 Although Utah courts have not interpreted 
this particular ordinance, we have had significant 
experience in assessing what is open to public view. 
In the search and seizure context, for example, we 
have consistently allowed officers to seize evidence 
when the evidence is '"in open view from a position 
lawfully accessible to the public.'" State v. Holden, 
964 P.2d 318,321 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 982 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah 1981)); see also State v. Belgard, 840 
P.2d 819,823 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that once 
officer is in a place "lawfully accessible to the 
public," officer is "free to observe whatever was in 
his open view that might have been observed by any 
other member of the general public"). 
Tf 17 It is undisputed that the officer in the instant 
case saw defendant kiss the exposed breasts of the 
woman he was with and he saw defendant's exposed 
genitals. It is also undisputed that the officer 
witnessed this sexual conduct from a place lawfully 
accessible to any member of the general public-as he 
stood in a public parking lot Given the well-accepted 
standard in Utah case law regarding what it means to 
be in a place open to public view, I see no need to 
look to the case law of foreign jurisdictions. My 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the foreign 
jurisdictions cited in the main opinion would import 
a "likely [to be] seen by a casual passerby" standard, 
which is required neither by the plain language of the 
instant ordinance nor by the relevant Utah case law. 
1[18 Accordingly, I would affirm outright the 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Defendant additionally contends the terms of the 
ordinance make it unconstitutionally vague and thus void. 
However, defendant raises this argument for the first time 
on appeal. "[Issues raised for the first time on appeal will 
be addressed only if the trial court proceedings 
demonstrated 'plain error.'" State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 
333 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate or even allege plain error by the trial court: 
thus, we do not address his vagueness argument. 
2. Defendant contends that section 11.16.100 does not 
define "sexual conduct," basing his argument on an 
interpretation of subsection C, governing intentional 
exposure of the genitals. However, "sexual conduct" is 
defined by section 11.16.010, and because the trial court 
could reasonably have found that sexual conduct occurred^ 
we need not address defendant's argument regarding; 
subsection C. 
3. We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the 
interpretation of the statutory language "in a place open to 
public view" in this disorderly conduct lewdness ordinance 
should be drawn from decisions holding that Fourth 
Amendment protection from unlawful search does not 
attach to objects in plain view of apolice officer. While "[i]t 
has long been the law that objects falling within the plain 
view of an officer from a position where he is entitled to be 
are not the subject of an unlawful search," State v. Holden, 
964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)), this case does not 
challenge the legality of a search under the Fourtn 
Amendment As the New York Court of Appeals noted in 
rejecting a similar argument: "plainly, the existence of a 
diminished expectation of privacy [for Fourth Amendment 
purposes] does not transform the interior of an automobile 
into a 'public place.'" People v. McNamara, 585 N-E-2d? 
788, 791 (N.Y. 1991) (interpreting term "public place"> 
The policy under the Fourth Amendment governing when 
an officer may search an automobile and the policy behind 
when disorderly conduct occurs "in a place open to public 
view" are entirely different. The former controls officer 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment; the latter protects 
citizens from observing lewd private conduct Our 
interpretation comports with this policy difference and is 
consistent with case law from our sister states. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, 
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KEITH W ROBERTS 
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y and County of Salt Lake 
i 1 Pn **' 31 
INFORMATION 
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E UNDERSIGNED of Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake, 
te of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above 
te defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown, 
Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah on or about 
09/99 20:45, at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and state 
resaid did commit the public offense of 
LATING THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE, as follows, to-wit: 
T I: Disorderly Conduct 
endant, while in a place open to public view, willfully; engaged in 
ual conduct, alone or with another person or an animal; or, made an 
entional exposure of his or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks or 
portion of the areola and/or nipple of the female'breast. A Class 
isdemeanor. 
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 11.16.100 
counts located at approximately 900 W 1860 S 
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ity Prosecutor 
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OCT 2 5 1999 
-oOo-
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
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KEITH W. ROBERTS, 
Defendant. 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of 
August, 1999, commencing at the hour of 4:52 p.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the City: 
For the Defendant: 
RICHARD W. DAYNES 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East 
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1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 MR. DAYNES: Your Honor, I guess 
4
 there's one matter remaining, that's the Keith Roberts. 
5 THE COURT: Yup. Are you ready? 
6
 MR. DAYNES: We are, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay* This is Salt Lake 
8
 City versus Keith Roberts, Case No. 991914252; 
9 MR. DAYNESt Your>Honorr maybe we 
10
 could address this at this time; 
11 Mr. ^McCullough filed a trial memorandum which— 
12 THE COURT: Yeahf I've read it^ 
13 MR. DAYNESr —in my opinion is 
14 basically A motion, looks' like*a motion to dismiss and^it 
15 goes— 
16 THE COURT Well, the problem with 
17 that, I don't-see any facts, I'd sure like to hear some 
18 facts and then maybe he can argue his motion.-
19 MRC McCULLOUGHT I intend ^ o make a 
20
 motion to^dismiss at the* end of their case, very 
21 obviously, yout Honor, 
22 T^HE COURT: Okayi 
23 MR: McCULLOUGH: But I can only 
24 surmise at this point what the facts will show, 
25 THE COURT: Well, that's what I 
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1
 assumed when you wrote this, that maybe I'd better hear 
* I some testimony* 
HR. DAYNES: And—and your Honor, as 
4
 far as whether this was—and I think the Issue An this 
5
 case "that Hr. McCullough has raised, is whether it's-a 
* | public place or open<,to public view— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR; DAYNES: —and if that's all 
9






case.law itself would—would support—we could address 
H that issue right now and—and then go forward with— 
THE .COURT: But I don't know uWhere it 
occurred. All I have is an address; Ninth West and 1860 
South. I don't know anything more than that. If it*was 
in the middle ofkthe street, that's a different story* 
16 I if it were some place else, then I might view it .a little 
17
 hit differently. 
18 MR. DAYNES: - If I--if I made a 
19
 proffer to the Court that the events,,and we're just 
20 talking about whether the-law meets^this particular 
21 J circumstance at this point „in time and I—and I would not 
objgflt^  to going forward with the—with the evidence at 
23 I that point in time; but if the only issue is whether an 
24 individual in a car is open to public view— 
25 THE COURT: Well, in a place open to 
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public view. That's the language. 
MR. DAYNES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. McCULLOUGHx I have some 
questions I need to ask the observing officers, your 
Honor. I don't think we'll take a long time at it, but I 
need to ask those questions. 
THE. COURT: All right. Let's— 
MR. DAYNES: No objection,vyour 
Honor. 
THE COURT: That's okay, because 
maybe when he tells us what he did and everything and 
what went-on, it might impact all of us. 
All right. -Call your first—how many witnesses 
do you have? Two or ^one? 
MR.^DAYNES: Two—two witnesses, your 
Honor. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I would move to 
exclude,.your Honor? but" I' assume he'll say-whichever one 
doesn't come up first is his assistant, so... 
MR. DAYNES: We would—we would 
request— 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) your stuff, 
Mr. McCullough. 
MR. DAYNES: —that Officer Player be 
5 
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THE COURT: Your helper? 
MR. DAYNES: —agent for the City. 
THE COURT: Okay. Call your -witness. 
Bring him up here, let's get him sworn—sworn in. 
MR. DAYNES: Call Officer Russell to 
the stand. 
ANTHONY RUSSELL. 
called as a witness by and on .behalf of the City in this 
matter; after having been- first duly swornf assumed the 
witness ..stand, and was examined and. testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAYNES: 
Q Please state your full name. 
A Anthony Russell. 
Q Spell your last .name. 
A R-u-s-s-e-1-1. 
Q Officer Russell, you are employed with the Salt 
Lake City Police Department; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And how long have you been with the City Police 
Department? 
A Over five years, now. 
Q What is your assignment as a police officer? 
A Right now, undercover vice. 
6 
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Q How long have you been -in the vice squad? 
A A year. 
Q Turning your attention to July 9th of this 
year, 1999, approximately
 r I guess-8:00 p.m., 8:45 in the 
evening, can you tell me what events transpired around 
that—that -date— 
A Sure. 
Q, —that time. 
A We were working south State Street where the 
majority of our prostitutes are and I recognized one 
prostitute that we've'.dealt with numerous times. 
Q Can you tell me the name of ..that prostitute? 
A It's Helba. She goes by a lot of different 
names. She—I think her real name is Melba—Melba 
Sanders. 
Q And this Melba Sanders,- you—you've-dealt with 
her on previous^ prostitute^— 
A Hh .huh; 
Q —busts? 
A Uh huh* 
Q How many times? 
A Oh, I—I don't know. We have a file on her 
back at our place, I don't know how many times. 
Q But it's been more than one occasion; is that 
correct? 
7 
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A Yeah. Yeah, I mean, we stop and talk to them 
quite "often and arrest .them and all that kind of stuff, 
so yeah, quite a few times. 
Q You saw her on State Street .at that particular 
5
 time? can you tell me what happened as you observed her? 
® A Yeah. I was—I parked across the street so she 
7
 couldn't see .me and I watched sixer ^ approach several cars 
8 and I watched her get into-a car, ,and-we followed it. , 
9 J Q flow many cars did she approach before she 
finally got into one? 
11
 A r think it was three. Threes 
12 Q What did you do, after you observed .her .^ get into 
13
 this last vehicle? 
14
 A We followed it;. 
15
 Q What— 
16
 :A In fact*, theret-was; three vice officers .onf>at 
17 that time, so we—we followed it* rotated the tail. 
18 Q What kind of car**was it that she got into? 
19 A I believe it was a—what do you call it, has a 
20 bed in it? El Camino-type cary I believe. 
21 Q And what— 
22 A It may be a truck• 
23 Q But do you remember what color it was? 
24 A It was a dark color, I believe. I believe it 
25 was a blue-, but I'm just trying, to figure. We deal with 
8 
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J so many cars, I— 
p 




 A No, I'm not sure. 
Q —or what kind of car it was,^but you *do 
5
 remember following a vehicle at that time? 
6
 A Oh, yeah. Uh huh. 
7
 Q Okay. Where did that vehicle go to? 
*H A It first went over to the area of 1300 South 
9
 I 500 West underneath the viaduct. 
Q And what did it do at that location? 
A- Well, that's—that's one of our more popular 
places where we catch prostitutes and so we set up— 
there's only one way you can come out of there and the 
car went in there> or started to go that way and we 
noticed—I noticed - a .marked unit drive by;, I think it 
spooked them, I don't know for sure, but it turned back 
17
 I around and went back -over the viaduct. 
18
 I Q And where did you eventually—where did it 
19
 I eventually pull over?* 
20
 A Ninth West and 1860 South, I believe it was. 
21
 It's behind a—a bar there. 
22
 I Q Is it—is that located within the venue of Salt 
Lake Gity, Utah? 
24
 I A Yes. It is. 
25
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10 
11 
A We actually parked in front xzf the bar so they 
2 
couldn't see our car and^wesnuck around on foot^ oand 
3
 approached the car on foot. 
Q Did—did you come to ^a point where you Could 
5
 observe the vehicle? 
6
 A Yes. 
' Q Was—as this an area that's~open to public 
8 view? 
9
 J A Yes. It^s the back—it's-the.back parking lot 
tolthe--the bar. The bar sits—I don't know if you want 
me to draw*itf but the bar-sits on Ninth West, with a 
12
 parking lot that goes all the **ay around it and then 
^
3
 there£s~a business back there with some flat-bed trucks, 
14
 but there's no fence or^anything. 
15
 -Q Why don^t you go ahead and use the—the board 
16
 here? 
17 MR. DAYNES: Your Honor, may I 
18 approach the witness? 
19 THE COtJRT: You may. 
20 Q (By Mr. Daynes) Maybe you ought to .draw in 
21 some marks tinaudible) 
22 MR. McCULLOUGH: Is one of these 
23 cameras going to get this, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: No. He/ll have to draw 
25 it and then we'll have him describe what he's drawn. 
10 
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 MR. McCULLOUGH: Okay. 
2
 THE WITNESSi I'll try and do ±t 
° fast.* -Here's 900 West, there's a bar right here, the 
4
 Office Lounge, and this would be^west -this way. There's 
5
 a building right back here, the side street—this is all 
° the lot and there's parking^back^here and*, there was a 
7
 truck, a flat-bed truck parked right here. And this is a 
8
 little (inaudible) right here (inaudible) 
9
 I *Q (By Mr. Daynes) Could you give me another 
color of marker there? 
Using a different-colored marker,, could you 
12
 indicate where their vehicle was when they pulled into 
13
 that lot? 
1 4
 A Their car—they tpuHed t in and came i n and 
^ parked r i g h t about here. 
16 Q- You— 
1 M A This is (inaudible) 
18
 Q Again, this is a—this building that you got 
19
 just above 900 West, what is that? 
20
 A This is the Office Lounge (inaudible) 
21 Q oh. 
22
 A (Inaudible) bar. 
23 Q Okay. And this lot: that you've designated 
2
* would be slashed line, that's the parking lot for that 
25 bar? 
11 
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1
 I A Yeah. But—yeah. This is all a^lot and it's 
all kind of open so you can park in-Jiere^  you.can park 
8
 I back here. 
4
 Q So anybody can,walk, into^that area, right into 
5
 that area? 
8
 A Yeah. In fact* we walked—we parked right here 
7
 and we walked this way all the way back into this area, 
8
 into this section. And I believe—I'm not sure about the 
9 J officer, but I believe another officer was right about in 
10
 i this area. Yeah, this is all opei** 
"I'M Q What happened when you approached the vehicle? 
12 What is it that you saw? 
13
 J A. Actually, what I did is, I—this is a flat-bed 
14 I truck and the cab of it was*right here, so 1 underneath— 
15 I underneath the flat-bed truck,,. came up so I was in a 
16
 position right about \ there*. 
17
 Q So at this point in time, you're on the other 
18
 side of the truck? 
19 A Uh huh. 
20 THE COURT: .You need.to get up and, 
21 just kind of describe that on the record for us to make 
22 sure we get a good record of^it, okay? 
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: Just come on up here and 
25 speak--
12 
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THE WITNESS: Oh. JJpjfaere? 
THE COURT: . Yeah. We need to get you 
on camera;-
THE WITNESS: Sorxy< 
THE COURT: Xt doesnft— 
THE WITNESSr -Okay.. 
THE COURT: We can pull that -.back 
behind him and I think get a shot of it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
HR. DAYNES: Would you like me to do 
that, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah.. Just cdescribe now 
what you've drawn there. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. X^ve drawn Ninth 
West and the Office Lounge, the bar, is the big— 
rHE COURT: Move it a little more 
; this way. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. This— 
THE COURT: Okay. How, what I'm 
going to try to do is get the camera on you, so talk real 
loud,~okay? 
THE WITNESSz Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. We're—go 
ahead. Describe. 
! THE WITNESS: Okay. The Office 
13 
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Lounge is this box right here, the lower one, closest to 
Ninth West. Up here is another building and surrounding 
the Office Lounge is open parking lot or an open lot. 
Parked right there, and the big black box was a flat-bed 
truck and just to the west of that in the blue that I've 
highlighted is where the suspect—the A.P. parked his 
car. The blue here designates my routd that I walked on 
foot. 
MR. DAYNES: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just going to 
switch back to our four-vay mode- All right. 
MR. DAYNES: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Daynes) 'Now, you eventually did 
approach this vehicle? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q The first—the *first—-before you got to the 
vehicle, what did you see? 
A What I saw is, wfeen I was standing right there, 
I was approximately 15 to 20 ie&t -away and I could see 
into the back -window. 
How graphic do you want: me— < 
Q Better go ahead and— 
A I'll try and be— 
Q All the details. 
14 
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1
 A Okay. She was sitting in the passenger^seat 
2
 turned toward him. I saw her lift her shirt, exposing 
3 her breasts. I .saw the driver put ,his;jwmfch to sher 
4
 breasts, okay, and that's when I approached the car from 
5 the back. 
6 Q Now, you've mentioned you saw the driver; do 
7 yCu see the drivei in the courtroom today? 
8 A Yesi I do* 
9 *Q Would you identify where he is at? What he's 
10 wearing? 
11 I & Ke's^sittinq at the defendant's table in a 
12 cowboy shirt and^blue Levis, brown shirt. 
13 MR. DAYNES: your Honor, let— 
14 THE WITNESS: Next to his attorney. 
15 MR* DAYNES: —-let the record.reflect 
16 tb^ witness has identified the defendant? 
17 THE COURT: It may. 
18 Q (By Mr. Daynes) As you approached; the vehicle, 
19 did you—did^youi,notice anything else? 
20 A I approached the vehicle on the passenger side, 
2A \ i came down this way. 
22 Q Were you, still outside of the vehicle at this 
23 point in time? 
24 A Am 13 
25 @ Yes. 
15 
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A Yeah. I didn't—J mever went inside -the 
vehicle, but yeah? and I went up to her window and 
knocked on the window, with my -badge out and identified 
myself. 
Q What could you see from the outside of the 
vehicle? 
A Her shirt was still up and his pants~were down, 
his penis exposed. He was doing up his pants at the— 
like--
Q Did you Mirandize—did you—did you actually 
arrest -these individuals? 
& Yes. . I did. 
1Q Did ^ you Mirandize' each of them? 
A I Mirandized her. 
Q Okay. And did—did anybody else Mirandize the 
defendant? 
A I believe Officer Player did. 
Q You didn't hear what the officer was with 
Officer Playerr though? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q This area that you were at* where you were 
looking into the vehicle, that's an area that anybody 
from the public,'from the bar, anybody could—could walk 
back in that location and— 
A Yes. 
16 
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 Q —and anybody could Jiave Been the event that 
* you had seen? 
q | 
° A Yes. I meanf stJiey jwere-r:they^werersomewhat 
4
 hidden from this truck* T mean, they7re not going to go 
5 park, you know, in .someone's driveway; but while we were 
6
 interviewing them after, right in here:there^wascnum^rous 
7 people coming .from the bar and getting into their trucks 
8
 and leaving^ so this gave them ^ a^little—this flat bed 
9
 J gave them,a little bit iof .hiding:room, but yeah, you can 
walk back there, just like I did^ People were parked 
right; here.-
Q And other people could have—from the bar, 
18
 could Jiave been^in that location as well? 
14
 A 0h, yes. Yeah. 
15
 MB. .DAYNES^ No further tjuestions at 
16
 this time, your Honor. 
17
 CROSS-EXAMINATION * 
18
 BY MR: McCULLOUGH: 
19
 Q The actual best way, Officer, to get close to 
20 that^vehicle without disturbing ^ anybody "in advance is to 
21 crawl under the truck though; is that right? I*-mean, 
22 that'.s -the only real way you could get at .them * was to 
23 crawl under the truck? 
24 A No. 
25 Q Well, then why did-you crawl under the truck? 
17 
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A So they—so-1Aey wouldn't«\see me^ 
Q All right. So, if you had come there without 
crawling under the truck, you would liave been afraid that 
they would have seen * you? 
5
 A Well, yeah. 
6
 Q And might have stopped what they were doing? 
7
 A Yeah. 
8 Q Which is what they were legally required to do 
9 [ if the public came to watch; correct? 
A I don't think so. Z -don't think you can be 
11 exposing yourself in public— 
12
 I Q Officer— 
A --at any time. 
Q , —in your police report, you've talked about, 
15 quote, behindwa .couple of parked flat-bed trucks; Where's 
16 the other one? 
17
 I A I don't—there "may-have been another one here. 
I just remember the one. 
19 I Q -All righto So there may .have been another one 
20
 between that bar and—and the defendant? 
21 A No. If—if anything^ it was right here, 
22
 because there was cars that were coming, that were 
23 backing out. There's more room in here than that. There 
24 was a truck that backed up and left but, I don't know, 
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THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. McCULLOHGH: All right. 
(By Mr, McCullough) Now, you said there was— 
another building. Up there in your W, you have 




Yes. It is. 
Do you^know what the* building is? 




















So nobody, as^far as you can tell, could have 
the back of that building,to the west there and 
out the window and seen this? 
No. 
'Cause there's a blank wall, two*stories high? 
Let me—there is a road that comes right here. 
By all means, if you- need to draw some other 
draw it. 
There's a—a road that comes right in this way 
19 
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10 
11 
I and there's a—an entrance^into this-right here—not an 
entrance, but a, you know]; a driveway. 
3
 ' *Q But that wall— 
4
 A This road is right there, 
5
 Q That building has a blank two-story wall 
° without windows? 
7
 A I can't—I don't know. I don't recall any 
8
 windowsr but there may be. 
9
 J Q All right. Now, what about to the—to my left, 
your right of the—of * the ^-drawing, you just draw a 
squiggly 1 Tire "there. 
12
 A Right <iiere? 
13
 Q Yeah. What's—what's in that area? 
*
4
 A T don't know.. I believe -this is a chain link 
15
 fence right here, I believe it's chain link <all the way 
16 around for the businesses, but I'm not sure. 
17
 Q All right. Did you see anybody over there? 
18
 A Yeah. Over on the, other side of the fence? 
19 Q Yeah. 
20 A No. I saw people in the parking lot. 
21 Q okay. So people coming, out of the bar? 
22 A Yeah. In the parking lot. 
23 Q All right. Any *of them crawl under the truck 
24 to see what was going on? 
25 A No. 
20 
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Q And—=and you give me a strange look. - That7 in 















it? . To crawl under a truck.to^.see whaf.s going 
If you're not a vice officery*-maybe. 
Officer, did you think in any manner that this 
was attempting to show off his penis in public? 
show the—the public what—what a nice one he 
I think he -was picking up a prostitute 
That's what you think, but you don't have any 
of that one,, do you? 
Actually^ I have her—her— 
Yeah. But she's not here, is she? 
No. But I*:faave her interview withe me. 
All right. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: That's all. 
REDIRECT'EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PAYNES: 
Q You can get^  into this area-without having to 





Oh> yeah. You can walk this way, you can come 
you can come down this way. 
There's—there's lots of ways of get into that 
and there's—and—and there are peopl-e that!are 
21 
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 constantly going in and out of t h i s parking l o t while 
you're there; i s n ' t that correct? 
3 
' A Yeah. There was "two—yeah,.-two or three cars 
I (inaudible) the parking—the lot while .we were there. 
MR.-DAYNES: No further questions, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can step down. 
8
 Thank you, sir. 
&
 I r'm assuming you don't have anything more? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Nothing further, 
your Honor. 
1 2
 [ MR^  DAYNES: City would -cal l .Officer 
1 3
 i Player to-the stand. 
14
 I SHAWN PLAYER. 
15 | called as a witness by and on behalf of the City in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
17 witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
18
 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19
 BY MR. DAYNES: 
20 Q Please state' your full name. 
21 A Shawn Player. 
22 q spell your last name. 
23 A P-1-a-y-e-r. 
24 Q officer— 
25 MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, could I 
22 
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ask him to spell his first name, too? Shawn is a—is an 
unusual—there's all kinds of ways to spell it. 
THE WITNESS: S-h-a-w-n. 
MR; HcCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Daynes) Officer Player, you are 
employed with the Salt Lake City Police Department? is 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q How long have*~you been-^ with the City Police 
Department? 
A .Eive years * 
Q And you-are also assigned to the»~vice divisionr 
is =^ that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q You were part of this same incident or part of 
the same bust on the—=July the* 9th, 1999; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And-turning your attention -to- that, were you in 
the vehicle with Officer Russell? 
A No. ! 
Q You were in a different vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q But you did come to the same scene; is that 
correct? 
23 
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1
 I A Yes. 
2 
1




 A I parked in front of the Office Lounge, as did 
5
 Officer Russell. We walked down the north side of the 
6
 Office Lounge and we -could see the vehicle with the 
7




 I We walked up to the edge of the building, 
watched -them?for a few minutes^ and then approachedJthe 
trailer, ?stood behind the trailer. I walked to the front 
of the trailer*whichf at the time, was pointing south/ so 
I walked from a position here with Officer Russell to 
this position here, as Officer Russell walked, snuck 
15 underneath the flat-bed to the other si#e^ 
16
 Q Now, you said that there is—that the trailer 
17 was pointing south? 
18
 A Well, if I remember correctly—it was a flat-
19 bed, so it^was actually irrelevant .to the way it was it 
20 wasvpointing. 
21 Q So you, at that point in time, did you walk up 
22 to the vehicle? 
23 A No. I walked up to the front of the trailer* 
24 i
 Was the other officer that Detective Russell was 
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1 I Q what did you see from th£ front of the—of the-
2
 -<?r that point of the trailer? 
3 A I saw the top of the defendant's-car and two 
4
 h^ads. 
5 Q Could you see what was going on? 
6 A No. From where I -was at* I "could not. 
7 Q when you got closer, could you see what—what 
8
 w#s occurring in the vehicle? 
9 A No. Because by the time I got up there, 
10 Detective Russell had already approached and announced 
^ | himself a s a police officer. 
12 Q you spoke with the defendant in this case, ttr. 
13 Roberts, is that correct? 
14 & Yes.. 
15 Q Did you give him his Miranda rights? 
16 A Yes. I did. 
17 Q And did-he agree to speaK with-you? 
18 A -No. He said he did not want to talk. 
19 Q okay- This area around the vehicle, it's--
20
 0ther cars could park in that same and -similar location; 
21 is that correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And—and did you see other people coming out of 
24 the bar? 
25 A Yes. 
25 
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MR* DAYNES: No further questions at 
I <i And going t o their cars? 
2 
A Yes. Several. 
3 
1
 Q And t h i s — t h i s parking lot is a part of that 
4





 MR. McCULLOUGH: I think I have only« 




 I BY MR. McCULLOUGH; 
12 J Q Officer, why was it that you followed these 
people in the first place? 
A Because t h e — t h e other individual in the car T^ 
15 I Melba, is a known prostitute, which I have personally 
1® I picked up and arranged for a deal with sex and then 
1? arrested her after I identified myself as^an officer, 
18 which is standard procedure. 
19 Q *Thank you. 
20 MR. McCULLOUGH: That's all. 
21
 THE COURT: You can step down. 
22 J MR. DAYNES: At this time r t h e City 
would rest, your Honor. 
24 I THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McCullough? 
25 MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I 
26 
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suspect we will know that the City suspects that 
something went on there that they can't prove, that there 
was a commercial deal for sex, which is in violation of 
State and local statutes. 
5
 It/s not what they're charging because they 
6
 don't have any^evidence and they don't have any witness 
7
 to that, so they search like crazy and they come out with 
^ anything they can and they pull up a—an ordinance that's 
9 I designed to prohibit public indecency, public exposure 
and they say, well, if you crawl under a truck, you can 
^ I see these guys and if you walk up and look right through 
12
 I the window and tap on it, you can tell that he has his 
13
 I penis exposed* An officer several feet away looking at— 
around the truck, can only see the top of the vehicle and 
a couple of heads. 
The memorandum, I think, speaks for itself. 
This is not the—the—this is not the—the—the type of 
crime that the statute is designed to prohibit. I 
realize the State—the City's desperation and—and you 
know, maybe they'll do better next time and—and maybe my 










 J Honor, that what really we have here is somebody who 
23
 I says, you know, maybe I want to get to know this girl a 
24
 I little better, one way or another, and we need to get out 
of public viewr 'cause that's not proper in public^ 
27 
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I And he <jets out of public view and somebody who 
2 
thinks they know something, crawls under a truck to get a 
1
 better view. They still aren't able to see what they 
4
 need to seer by crawling under the truck, so he has to go 
5
 J up there and actually knock on the window and that's the 
time when he sees the exposed private parts. 
7
 That's—I think we're wasting an awful lot of 
* time and money* 
9
 I THE COURT: Anything you want to say? 
MR. DAYNES: I do, your Honor. 
11
 As to the defendant's motionf the charge of 
^ J disorderly conduct, the defendant, while in a place open 
to public -view, engaged in sexual conduct or made an 
intentional exposure of his or her genitals, pubic area 
or (inaudible) and then it goes on to some other items• 






"^  j in sexual conduct or intentionally exposed himself, 
18 | we've proved both of those, actually. This particular 
19 j location^is a public parking lot, is the parking lot 
20
 I that's designated— 
21 I THE COURTr Well, but are we talking 
22 I about -public place or something open to public view? ^ 
23 I MR. DAYNES: And—and I was going to 
24 get to that, your Honor. What I—the reason I brought up 
25 that was not that they were actually in the parking lot 
28 
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in a public place doing this, but they were in an area 
that was open to the public view. People could be 
walking up to their cars in the parking lot; in fact, 
Officer Russell wasn't all the way up to the car, he was 
5
 back by the truck when he first saw the defendant engage 
6
 in behavior where'he was actually apparently kissing the-
7
 -the breasts of the—of this other woman that was in the 
® vehicle with thim. He could see that from—before he even 
9 I got^to the car. 
It wasn't up until he got next to the car when 
he in fact saw that not only was he engaged—he was 
engaged in that conduct, but he was engaged, he had his— 
3^ his—his genitals exposed with his pants undone. 
14
 J Based on that, your Honor, the City has proven 
and—that this is open to public view, which is different 
than"toeing—something being done in a public place 
17
 J I could see if—if Mr. McCullough was—was 
1
^ I arguing that this was done in an open place, in a—in a 
19 I public place, that maybe you could claim that— 
THE COURT: Well, see, I would take 
the different view. If they were at Sugarhouse Park in a 
parking lot, doing it, that, in my mind, is a public 











24 rights. That's my view. 
MR. DAYNES: Where they're in any 
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public parking lot— 
2
 THE COURT: Well, that's the point. 
q f 
MR. DAYNES: —committed that crime. 
4
 It^SiOpen to public view. 
5
 THE COURT: I think—I think the 
6
 problem^is^that the language is tough to deal with, but 
7
 I'm not ^ oing to struggle with it too much. It was a 
8
 public parking JLot, in my view, it wasjopen to public 
9 vigg* I know Mr. McCullough takes a different viewpoint 
10
 than I do, but I'm going'to deny his motion. 
11




 MR. MCCULLOUGH: No, your Honor. 
14
 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
15
 MR. DAYNES: Would you like closing 
"16 argument, your Honor? 
17 THE COURT: No. I think I heard 
18
 enough unless—I mean, I think—I think Mr. McCullough is 
19 trying to make a legal argument here on the elements of 
20
 the offense and he doesn't think it fits. 
21 i guess it all depends on how you want to 
22
 interpret what a place open to public view is. I think 
23
 if you're in a public parking lot, it's a place open to 
24 public view because you have the public moving around in 
25 and out of the building and into the parking lot. 
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1
 I MR. DAYNES: We would submit it, your 
* Honor* 
3
 ' MR. McCULLOUGH: Sounds like the 
4
 Court's made up its mind, your Honor. I'm— 
5
 THE COURT: Yes, I have. Your 
® argumentiis well taken, Mr. McCullough, but I view it a 
7
 little bit ^differ exit ly than you do on .behalf of your 
® client* 1'ia going to find him guilty at this time. 
9 [ What's your pleasure? 
ilR. McCULLOUGH: We'd just as soon, 
your Honor—just a second. 
We'd.*just as soon go ahead, your Honor, as the 
Court may^not be surprised to hear, we'll ask the Court 
to stay any sentence because we will be asking for a 
15












THE COURT: That will probably be 
17 good. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: While the Court^may 
be aware, or may or may not be aware, that I'm also legal 
counsel for the Utah Nature Society and I tell my clients 
that if they—if they make efforts to stay away that they 
have complied .with the law and—and I've got to make sure 
23 I of that. 
2 4
 THE COURT: And that may or may not 
25 be right. 
31 
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MR- JMcCULLOUGH: And I—well, I've 
got "to make sure that—that the law is not expanded 
unduly and that'& something I have to do. 
THE COURT: I can understand that. 
5
 J Okay* What I'm going to do is sentence him to 
6
 ' 60-days in* jail; jsaaspend the jail time. In lieu of a 
7
 fine; I maxtt him to,perform 30 hours of community 
8
 service,. 12 months* good JDehavior probation. 
9
 J MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I'm 
filing a notice of appeal. 
May ^ we;suspend—I—I'm—I'm very concerned, 
obviously, ^ aboute*moving -it, so may we suspend the 30 
hours community service upon filing the notice of appeal? 
14
 I THE COURT: Yeah. Pending the 
^ J a p p e a l . 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes, of course, 
17
 Obviously. We'll have it filed by tomorrow, your Honor. 
18
 THE COURT: Well, that'll be fine. 
19
 THE CLERK: Just for record-keeping, 
20 how long to do the community service? 
21 THE COURT: Oh, let's see. We'll 
22 give^him three* months. 
23 ^Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
24 I * * * 
25 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



























STATE OF UTAH ) 
• 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I.am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
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Trial Court Judgment and Order, August 30, 1999 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





./ / . 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, PO. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
Plaintiff Case Number 9 9 / q / ^ *? 3 
Tape number C # 
Date 9- -<36 -<? 9 Time 
Ht=-i rH U) 
Defendant 
Judge/Comm WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Clerk mnu(2j/--
Plaintiff Counsel. 




COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
ail loO OPr^fS Suspended 
)efendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence
 r _ 
:ine Amt. $ Susp. $ 
bo QMS 
Fee$. Fine Bal $. 
Payment Schedule: Pay $_ 
Dourt Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt. Due 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
through Crucr- 11-36-9^ Community Service/WP *3c> \AO* LO< 
destitution $ Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
\ttorney Fees $ 
Drobation \ $L mrj/uru* Q'Good Behavior D AP&P • ACEC • Other 
Terms of probation: 
^No Further Violations • Counseling thru 
3 AA Meetings / wk / month • Classes 
U Follow Program 
3 No Alcohol 
• Antibuse 
• Employment 
• Proof of 
• In/Out Treatment. 
• Health Testing 
• Crime Lab Procedure 
• 
„ ^J? **** •€> 
Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
Review / / at 
4'&* *>/& 
>mpliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
ing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
t at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding 
HiQtnrt n n u r t ^ H ^ P ^ /-) 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant on this (%~ day of December, 2000 to: 
W. Andrew McCullough, LLC 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
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